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MEDICAL CREDIT CARDS:
A CLASH BETWEEN PHYSICIANS'
INTERESTS AND PATIENTS' RIGHTS
Lauren Horwitz*
As health care costs rise and patients become more dependent on credit
to pay medical bills, state legislatures should regulate the influence
doctors have over their patients'financial decisions. There is a growing
need for legislation that regulates the role physicians play in the
financial decisions their patients make to fund health care costs.
Rather than extend their own lines of credit, some physicians market the
services of credit-lending institutions to patients at times when the
patients are least likely to make financially responsible decisions. In
these instances, physicians overstep their bounds when they provide
financial advice to their patients, particularly when their own financial
interests are in conflict with the financial interests of their patients.
I. INTRODUCTION
On Monday, your painful toothache served as a reminder to see
a dentist for a checkup. Today, just four days later, your dentist
diagnoses you with more than a simple cavity: your toothache is
actually evidence of a rather extensive oral health problem, advanced
periodontal disease. Should you choose to forego the $1,500 soft-
tissue grafts1 that your dentist recommends today, the problem could
rapidly develop into an even more serious issue. Because you have
diabetes, periodontal disease presents the risk of significant health
* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.S. in Business
Administration, emphasis in Economics, University of Arizona. I would like to thank the editors
and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their dedication to publishing this Note, as
well as a special thanks to Professor Brietta R. Clark and Associate Professor Lauren E. Willis for
their guidance and insight on this topic. As always, a thank-you to my family for their continuing
encouragement and support, and most importantly, their endless appetite for learning more and
more about medical credit cards.
1. WebMD.com, Dental Health: Gum Disease Treatments, http://wvwv.webmd.com/oral-
health/guide/gum-disease-treatments (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
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complications.2 The dentist's $1,500 solution, which represents a
hefty sum, could restore the health of your gums and bones, and stop
any developing damage.3 Unfortunately, you don't have $1,500 to
spare, and like so many other Americans,4 you have no dental
insurance. Thankfully, your dentist accepts medical credit cards as a
form of payment. The line of credit your dentist accepts is offered
by a credit card company you have heard of before, and according to
the literature in the dentist's examination room, you could be
approved before you leave the office. The dentist's office manager
can even help you contact the credit card company, submit the
application, and recommend repayment options, as she has done for
many other patients. You choose to apply for the card so that you
can proceed with treatment as soon as possible.
In the hypothetical scenario above, the patient expected to incur
some sort of medical expense when visiting the dentist. When faced
with the possibility of losing teeth and suffering complications of
periodontal disease associated with diabetes, the patient heeded the
dentist's warnings and recommendations for treatment, just as the
court in Magan Medical Clinic v. California State Board of Medical
Examiners5 predicted the patient would.6 However, the dentist
described above not only recommended treatment for a health issue
but also recommended a way to pay for it, provided the patient with
the option of borrowing the cost of treatment from a third-party
lender without ever leaving the office, and helped the patient choose
a repayment rate.
2. Diane B. Wayne, Cynthia P. Trajtenberg & David J. Hyman, Tooth and Periodontal
Disease: A Review for the Primary-Care Physician, 94 S. MED. J. 925, 928-29 (2001).
3. American Academy of Periodontology, Soft Tissue Grafts, http://www.perio.org/
consumer/grafts.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
4. More than 100 million people in the United States do not have dental insurance. Alex
Berenson, Boom Times for U.S. Dentists, But Not for American's Teeth, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
2007, at Al.
5. 57 Cal. Rptr. 256 (Ct. App. 1967).
6. Id. at 263. The court in Magan Medical Clinic recognized that in the physician-patient
relationship,
the patient is a captive consumer. There is no other profession or business where a
member thereof can dictate to a consumer what brand [s]he must buy .... how fast
[s]he must consume it and how much [s]he must pay with the further condition to the
consumer that any failure to fully comply must be at the risk of [her] own health.
MEDICAL CREDIT CARDS
Physicians have always had the ability to impact patients'
financial health through normal price setting.7  Typically, in
nonemergency situations, physicians can turn away patients who
cannot pay the price of treatment; 8 at other times, they may choose to
extend a personal line of credit to patients so the patients can pay
their balance directly to the physician over time.9 Issues arise when
physicians move far beyond their traditional role of providing
therapeutic treatment and accepting payment for it, and instead
choose to market a specific type of credit or loan to their patients, aid
their patients in obtaining those lines of credit or loans, and influence
the financial terms that will dictate their patients' relationships with
third-party lenders.
This Note identifies the need for legislation that regulates the
role of physicians in recommending, and aiding patients in obtaining,
medical credit cards and loans on the spot as opposed to simply
accepting these lines of credit and loans as forms of payment.0
Furthermore, the legislation proposed in Part V would complement
proposed changes in the regulation of the financial markets. "
Additionally, this Note explains why the California state
legislature is justified in regulating physicians who aid patients in
obtaining a certain line of credit or loan geared toward paying
medical bills, regardless of whether their motivation is driven by
profit, sincere concern for patients' physical health, or a combination
of the two. The solution requires physicians to maintain a traditional
7. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and
the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 660-63 (2008).
8. Lois Shepherd, HIV, the ADA, and the Duty to Treat, 37 Hous. L. REv. 1055, 1082-84
(2000).
9. See, e.g., Lisa Girion, Why the Doctor Won't See You Now, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2008,
at Al.
10. California State Senate Bill 1633, which addressed some of the concerns presented in
this Note, was vetoed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger on September 27, 2008. He cited the
"historic delay" in passing a 2008-2009 state budget as the main impetus for his decision. S.B.
1633, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008), Veto Message, http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-
08/bill/sen/sb_1601-1650/sb_1633_vt20080927.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). The bill's
attributes are discussed further in Part V.
11. See, e.g., Kara Scannell & Sudeep Reddy, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile House
Panel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2008, at Al; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Federal Reserve Approves Rules That Will Better Protect Credit Card Users (Dec. 18, 2008)
(on file with author).
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professional relationship with their patients and avoid unduly
influencing their patients' financial decisions. 12
The remainder of this Note is divided into five sections. Part II
discusses the characteristics of medical credit cards and loans. Part
III describes how the California judiciary and legislature currently
regulate conflicts of interest that relate to physicians' financial
interests, patients' interests in sound treatment, and patients'
financial interests. Part III provides examples of California
legislation employed to curb specific types of conflicts of interest in
the medical profession. Part IV explains why California law does
not directly address the problems associated with medical credit
cards and loans. Parts V and VI propose and justify legislation to
regulate the influence of physicians on their patients' financial
affairs. Part VII provides an overview of the themes and ideas
presented in this Note.
12. This Note does not discuss the underlying reasons that patients need to assume credit
card debt to pay their medical bills, namely, an American system where "health care is expensive,
both in terms of health insurance premiums and for specific medical needs that insurance does not
cover." Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and Injured: The Rhetorical
Significance, But Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 229,
234 (2001); See also Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient: In Search of Non-Debt-Based
Alternatives, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 453 (2004) (explaining the effects of managed health care,
money management, and credit cards on the debtor-creditor/physician-patient relationship); E.
Haavi Morreim, High-Deductible Health Plans: New Twists on Old Challenges from Tort and
Contract, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (2006) (comparing the focuses of health care litigation in
different historical stages of the American health care system); E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine
Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring the Legal Standard of Care, 59 U. PITt. L. REV. 1 (1997)
(discussing the contribution of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act to health care for
the poor); Hall & Schneider, supra note 7 (highlighting the new consumer role of patients in the
medical marketplace).
Nor does this Note address the flaws in existing laws governing consumer credit. See
generally Nefertara Clark, Finance and Other Charges: Is Disclosure for the Sake of Disclosure
Sufficient?, 33 S.U. L. REV. 313 (2006) (discussing the nature of finance charges under the Truth
in Lending Act); Peter V. Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44
EMORY L.J. 587 (1995) (discussing coercive remedies in the context of the lender-borrower
relationship).
Further, this Note does not address whether physicians who aid patients in obtaining lines
of credit or loans through third-party lenders, or even the lenders themselves, could be sued as
violators of the Consumer Credit Protection Act or other similar regulations. Consumer Credit
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13 (2006).
For an interesting discussion of the range of regulations affecting the credit card industry,
see Margot Saunders & Alys Cohen, Federal Regulation of Consumer Credit: The Cause or the
Cure for Predatory Lending? (Mar. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/babc/babc_04-21 .pdf
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II. BACKGROUND: MEDICAL CREDIT CARDS AND LOANS
The negative impact of the credit crisis in the United States is
widely documented. " The average American household carries
$8,565 in credit card debt, '4 and the total consumer revolving credit 15
owned and securitized as of August 2008 is at an all-time high of
over $969 trillion. 16 Reliance on credit cards to pay medical bills is
also a common phenomenon. 7  For example, patients used Visa
credit cards to pay for $19.5 billion in health care expenses in 2001.18
Medical credit cards and loans are offered by many of the same
major creditors as other nonspecialty credit cards. For example,
Citibank offers the Citi Health Card, "9 Capital One offers Healthcare
Finance loans, 20 GE Money offers the CareCredit credit card, 21 and
Chase offers the ChaseHealthAdvance credit card. 2 The difference
between a medical credit card or loan and a regular credit card or
loan is that the former is geared toward patients in need of financing
for medical treatment; the lines of credit or loans can only be used
13. According to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, "the trajectory of economic
activity beyond the next few quarters will depend greatly on the extent to which financial and
credit markets return to more normal functioning." Sudeep Reddy et al., Economic Fears
Reignite Market Slump, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2008, at Al. For a concise explanation of the
current credit crisis and related materials on the topic, see Nytimes.com, Credit Crisis-The
Essentials, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit-crisis/index.html
(last visited Mar. 21, 2009.).
14. Gretchen Morgenson, Given a Shovel, Digging Deeper into Debt, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2008, at Al.
15. Consumer credit is defined as "[sihort term loans to individuals for [the] purchase of
consumer goods and services." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). Revolving credit is a
"[t]ype of consumer credit.., which permits... a borrower to purchase goods or secure loans on
a continuing basis .... Id.
16. The Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Economic Research and Data: Consumer
Credit (October 7, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/Current/.
17. See, e.g., Amanda Gardner, More Americans Paying Their Medical Bills with Credit
Cards, MSN HEALTH & FITNESS, Jan. 16, 2007, http://health.msn.com/health-topics/article
page.aspx?cp-documentid= 100153442.
18. Cindy Zeldin & Mark Rukavina, Access Project: Demos, Borrowing to Stay Healthy:
How Credit Card Debt Is Related to Medical Expenses 9 (2007), available at
http://www.accessproject.org/adobe/borrowing-to-stay-healthy.pdf.
19. Citi Health Card, Home Page, https://www.citicards.com/cards/portal/healthcard/nsc/
content.do?screenlD=5000 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Citi Health Card, Home Page].
20. Capital One Healthcare Finance, Home Page, http://www.capitalonehealthcare
finance.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Capital One, Home Page].
21. CareCredit Home Page, http://www.carecredit.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2009)
[hereinafter CareCredit, Home Page].
22. ChaseHealthAdvance Home Page, http://www.chasehealthadvance.com/ (last visited
Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter ChaseHealthAdvance, Home Page].
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for medical treatment.23  The president of CareCredit recently
commented that its medical credit card was developed to finance
elective procedures only but noted the difficulty associated with
determining whether the procedure is actually elective before the
patient borrows on the card. 24
The number of physicians who accept these cards as a form of
payment is staggering. CareCredit is accepted by over 100,000
providers across the nation.25 As of October 15, 2008, 2,153
physicians of various specialties within 100 miles of downtown Los
Angeles accepted the Capital One Healthcare Finance loan in their
offices. 26  One hundred seven health practitioners within 25 miles of
downtown San Francisco accepted the Citi Health Card as of the
same date. 27
As with any vendor who accepts credit cards, physicians must
pay a fee to that lender in proportion to the charges their patients
incur on their accounts. 28 A physician gains benefits in exchange for
paying this fee. For example, physicians receive their compensation
from the third-party lender the day after the patient charges the cost
of treatment to the credit card or loan. 29  Additionally, the
23. Daniel Costello, Hospital Bills-but with Interest, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, at Fl.
24. Stacey L. Bradford, The Dangers of Medical Credit Cards, SMARTMONEY, Aug. 25,
2008, http://www.smartmoney.com/spending/rip-offs/the-dangers-of-medical-credit-cards-23744.
25. CareCredit, How CareCredit Works, http://www.carecredit.com/howcarecredit
works.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter CareCredit, How Carecredit Works].
26. This number is the sum of the physicians listed as those who accept Capital One
Healthcare Finance within 100 miles of zip code 90015 as of October 15, 2008. Capital One
Healthcare Finance, Find A Doctor, http://www.capitalonehealthcarefinance.com/dental/find.asp
(select "Doctors/Clinics that offer Capital One Healthcare Finance"; then enter "90015" in the
"Zip/Postal Code" search function; then select "100 miles" in the "Find a doctor within" search
function).
27. This number is the sum of the physicians listed as those who accept Citi Health Card
within 25 miles of zip code 94102 as of October 15, 2008. Citi Health Card,
https://www.citicards.com/cards/portal/healthcard/sc/providerSearch.do?screenlD=5042 (select
"Dentist" under "Provider type" on the pull-down menu; then select 25 miles in the "search
within" pull-down menu; then type "94102" in the "miles of zip code" search function).
28. Susan Davis, Why Your Medical Practice Should Take Credit Cards, ALLBUSINESS,
http://www.allbusiness.com/services/health-services-offices-clinics-doctors/4354111-1 .html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2009); Interview with Dr. X, Dentist, in Beverly Hills, Cal. (Sept. 26, 2008)
(identity of the interviewee withheld upon request) (audio recording on file with author). See,
e.g., CareCredit, Costs, http://www.carecredit.com/practices/dental/costs.php (last visited Jan. 16,
2009) [hereinafter CareCredit, Costs). For a fuller discussion on the overall concept of these
charges, see Mastercard Interchange Rates, http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchantLhow-works/
interchange-rates.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
29. Interview with Dr. X, supra note 28.
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physician's responsibility to collect payment from patients is
eliminated, and the burden of collecting outstanding balances shifts
from the physicians and their staff to a third-party lender. 3 This can
"ease payment headaches[,] . . . reduce billing costs . . . [and]
improve cash flow" for the physician. 3' In the current economic
climate, where small businesses like medical practices are suffering
financially because clients are unable to pay their bills on time,32 the
benefits of not relying directly on patients to pay their costs of
treatment can be significant.
There are three general levels of participation in which
physicians may choose to engage. The first level is simply
distributing information about the line of credit or loan of their
choice and then accepting that line of credit or loan as payment; the
second level is facilitating the application process; the third level is
influencing the patient's relationship with the third-party lender.
Each is discussed in turn below.
A. Physicians Marketing and Accepting Credit
Physicians who accept medical lines of credit and loans
commonly market them to patients.33 A dentist who accepted
CareCredit in years past and now accepts the Capital One Healthcare
Finance loan commented that both companies offer optional
assistance to physicians and their office staff about how to approach
patients on obtaining a line of credit or loan through third-party
lenders. 34  For example, third-party lenders provide physicians with
30. Davis, supra note 28.
31. Id.
32. Kelly K. Spors & Simona Covel, Slow Payments Squeeze Small Business-Owner, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 31, 2008, at BI; Girion, supra note 9.
33. Many third-party lenders tout access to marketing tools as part of the reason physicians
should accept their lines of credit and loans as payment. The specific ways that third-party
lenders aid physicians in marketing these lines of credit and loans is discussed more fully in Part
I.B. See, e.g., CareCredit, How to Offer CareCredit, http://www.carecredit.com/practices/
dental/how-to-offer.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter CareCredit, How to Offer]; Citi
Health Card, Features & Benefits: Ongoing Support, https://www.citicards.com/cards/portalU
healthcard/nsc/content.do?screenlD=5013#5 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Citi Health
Card, Features]; Capital One Healthcare Finance, Tools for Success, http://www.capitalonehealth
carefinance.com/dental/doctors/tools-for-success.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter
Capital One, Tools]; ChaseHealthAdvance, Marketing Support, http://www.chasehealth
advance.com/patient-financing/procedures/dental.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter
ChaseHealthAdvance, Marketing].
34. Interview with Dr. X, supra note 28. For example, CareCredit touts the "FREE
customized training and . . . materials" available to physicians as a way to aid patients in
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pamphlets35 that advertise the benefits of these lines of credit and
loans so that patients can reference official information, albeit
general and incomplete,36 before they leave the office. Some of the
lenders go so far as to provide scripts to physicians and their office
staff that provide the exact words that can aid in effectively
encouraging patients to borrow the cost of treatment on the medical
credit card or loan. 3
B. Physicians Aiding Patients to Obtain Credit
Physicians who accept medical credit cards and loans as a
method of payment can also use their own staff to aid patients in
applying for, and obtaining, the funds. 38 After physicians and their
staff use the marketing materials described above, they can help the
patient complete her credit or loan application and then submit it
online or via telephone. 39  Additionally, some third-party lenders
allow physicians to use a "preapproval" credit check to determine the
patient's eligibility before the physician discusses the payment
options with the patient.40 In these ways, the physician goes beyond
recommending a method of payment and actually helps the patient
assume debt from a third-party lender.
"successfully add[ing] CareCredit as a payment option." CareCredit, Myth Busters,
http://www.carecredit.com/practices/dental/myth-busters.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2009)
[hereinafter CareCredit, Myth].
35. E.g., Citi Health Card, Features & Benefits: Ongoing Support, https://www.citi
cards.com/cards/portal/healthcard/nsc/content.do?screenID=5013#1 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
36. For example, the Capital One Healthcare Finance pamphlet provided in physicians'
offices is a total of eight panels and provides minimal information about what an average patient
could expect to incur in finance charges. The only projected costs provided in the pamphlet are
for fixed-rate plans, for which the pamphlet notes that only customers with excellent credit
history will qualify. Individual monthly payments and interest rates are disclosed when the
application is approved. CAPITAL ONE HEALTHCARE FINANCE, SMART PAYMENT PLANS (2008)
(pamphlet on file with author).
37. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
38. E.g., CareCredit, Frequently Ask [sic] Questions: http://www.carecredit.com/practices/
dental/dental-faqs.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter CareCredit, How Patients Apply];
ChaseHealthAdvance, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.chasehealthadvance.com/
providers/faq.asp (follow "How do patients apply?" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 21, 2009)
[hereinafter ChaseHealthAdvance, How Patients Apply].
39. E.g., CareCredit, How Patients Apply, supra note 38; ChaseHealthAdvance, How
Patients Apply, supra note 38.
40. E.g., CareCredit, How Patients Apply, supra note 38.
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C. Physicians Determining Terms of Financial Relationships
The financial relationship created by a patient's use of a line of
credit or loan to pay a medical bill is between the lender and the
patient-the physician is not part of this relationship. 4" In order to
accept the medical credit card or loan as a form of payment, the
physician pays a portion of what the patient borrows from the third-
party lender as a transaction fee to that lender,42 and the lender and
patient conduct their lender-borrower relationship apart from the
physician.43 Although the financial relationship is between the
patient and the third-party lender, some third-party lenders also allow
physicians to choose, or help their patients choose, from among a list
of options that will dictate the patient's relationship with the third-
party lender." For example, the physicians who accept CareCredit
as a form of payment select which available promotional rates45 to
offer their patients. 46 Even though a patient can apply for the line of
credit online without a physician's suggestion,47 the specifics of the
financial relationship between the lender and borrower are not
determined until the patient charges the credit card and the physician
41. E.g., CareCredit, Myth, supra note 34; Citi Health Card Program, For Providers:
Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.citicards.com/cards/portal/healthcard/nsc/content.do?
screenlD=5014 (follow "What if my patients/clients don't pay their bills?" hyperlink) (last visited
Mar. 21, 2009) [hereinafter, Citi Health Card, Using the Program]. This fee system is identical to
the relationship that any vendor has with a credit card company. Mastercard Interchange Rates,
supra note 28.
42. E.g., ChaseHealthAdvance, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.chasehealth
advance.com/provider/faq.asp (follow "Why is there a service fee charged to the practice?"
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) [hereinafter ChaseHealthAdvance, Service Fee]; Citi
Health Card, Plan Options & Fees, https://www.citicards.com/cards/portal/healthcard/nsc/
content.do?screenIlD=5016 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Citi Health card, Plan
Options].
43. E.g., Citi Health Card, Using the Program, supra note 41.
44. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Dawn, Patient Customer Service Representative,
CareCredit (Oct. 24, 2008); Citi Health Card Program, For Providers: Frequently Asked
Questions, https://www.citicards.com/cards/portal/healthcard/nsc/content.do?screenlD=5014
(follow "Can I choose which payment plan options I offer to my patients?" hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Citi Health Card, Enrolling].
45. There are currently two promotional rates a physician can choose between: a low-interest
plan and a no-interest plan. Of course, the no-interest plan stipulates that should the patient fail to
make timely payments, the "promo[tional rate] may be terminated and finance charges assessed
from [the] purchase date." CareCredit, Payment Plans, http://www.carecredit.com/payment
plans.html (follow "Click here for Details and Terms" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
46. Telephone Interview with Rebecca, Healthcare Provider Customer Service
Representative, CareCredit (last name withheld) (Oct. 24, 2008).
47. CareCredit, Apply Now for Instant Approval, http://www.carecredit.com/apply/
index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter CareCredit, Instant Approval].
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approves a specific repayment plan.48 If the physician chooses not to
approve a patient for a promotional rate, GE Money's online credit
application indicates that "the Purchase Standard Rate and Cash
Standard Rate APRs will equal the prime rate plus 18.99%, but in no
event will be less than 22.98%."
4
Some third-party lenders incentivize physicians to recommend
specific payment options by offering to lower the physicians'
merchant discount rates in exchange. For example, the Citi Health
Card's merchant discount rate, the fee a physician pays to Citibank to
accept the credit card as a form of payment, " is directly related to
which payment plan the patient assumes.5 If the patient borrows on
a three-month, no-interest plan for a treatment of $99 or more, the
physician pays a 1.5 percent merchant discount rate.52 However, if
the patient borrows on the "budget payment plan" for a treatment
exceeding $1,000, the physician pays a substantially higher 4.5
percent merchant discount rate. "
Thus, where physicians can determine the financial details of a
contract between their patients and a third party, a risk exists that
physicians will recommend repayment plans based on their own
financial well-being rather than their patients' welfare. Returning to
the hypothetical situation described in Part I, upon the dentist's
recommendation, the patient borrows the cost of treatment from a
lender. However, had the patient visited another physician that day
or been provided with a more thorough explanation of available
options, the patient could have received a better rate on her loan or
line of credit, or perhaps the patient could have been made aware that
the physician had a financial incentive to recommend that particular
plan.
48. Telephone Interview with Rebecca, supra note 46; Telephone Interview with Dawn,
supra note 44.
49. CareCredit, Online Credit Application: Key Credit Terms, http://www.carecredit.com/
apply/index.html (follow "I'm not ready to choose a doctor yet" hyperlink; then select "Dental" in
the drop-down menu; then click "Next") (last visited Nov. 2, 2008) [hereinafter CareCredit,
Online Application].
50. Mastercard Interchange Rates, supra note 28.




III. STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW
There are two types of conflicts of interest that may arise in the
physician-patient relationship. First, conflicts arise in which the
physician's own interests conflict with the patient's interest in sound
treatment. Second, conflicts arise in which the physician's own
interests conflict with the patient's non-treatment interests.
Currently, California law does not directly address concerns arising
from medical credit cards and loans. Nonetheless, key statutory and
common law concepts regulating conflicts of interest in the medical
profession provide guidance on legislative protection for patients
who choose to borrow on medical credit cards and loans.
A. Physicians' Financial Interests Versus Patients'
Interests in Sound Treatment: A Fiduciary Relationship
The most direct way to examine the physician-patient
relationship is by evaluating the constellation of fiduciary duties
owed by a physician to a patient.54 These duties arise as a result of
the traditional nature of the physician-patient relationship: the
treatment relationship. The court in Canterbury v. Spence55
emphasized the importance of trust between patients and physicians
by finding that the physician-patient relationship deserves
accountability beyond that expected of parties in an arm's-length
relationship.56 However, current case law does not provide a cause
of action for a patient whose financial health was damaged by the
physician's negligent recommendation of a third-party lender.
Instead, courts have limited the scope of a physician's fiduciary duty
to his patients to issues relating to treatment only. "
In 1947, the court in Bowman v. McPheeters 5 explicitly labeled
the physician-patient relationship a fiduciary one. There, the
physician's fiduciary duty to his patient obligated him not to conceal
the origin of the patient's ailment, namely, the physician's own
54. See generally, RAFAEL CHODOS, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES (2000) (offering a
comprehensive explanation of the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient).
55. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
56. Id. at 782.
57. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 599, 609 (Cal. 1993); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990).
58. 176 P.2d 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947).
59. Id. at 748.
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negligence. 60 The court further held that because of the fiduciary
duty that physicians owe to their patients, physicians are required to
make a "full and fair disclosure . . . of all facts which materially
affect [the patient's] rights and interests."'"
In Cobbs v. Grant,62 the California Supreme Court expounded
on the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship. The
court found that a physician has an obligation to disclose to the
patient all of the information "relevant to a meaningful decisional
process." 63  The court commented that because patients have "an
abject dependence upon and trust in [their] physician," the physician
should be held to a high standard of accountability when advising his
patients. 64
More recently, in Moore v. Regents of University of California,65
the California Supreme Court noted that while a physician's
fiduciary obligations to his patient require him to disclose his own
research or economic interests in the patient's treatment,6 6 this duty
does not flow from an obligation to protect the patient's financial
well-being. 67 Further, the court explained that "[a] physician is not
the patient's financial adviser." 
68
Finally, in Arato v. Avedon,69 the California Supreme Court
reiterated that a physician's duty to obtain informed consent does not
require the physician to inform patients of the financial impact of a
certain course of treatment. 7 The claim in Arato stemmed from the
defendant physicians' failure to disclose relevant mortality rates of a
60. Id. at 749-50.
61. Id. at 748.
62. 502 P.2d I (Cal. 1972).
63. Id. at 10; see also Stafford v. Shultz, 270 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1954); Berkey v. Anderson, 82
Cal. Rptr. 67, 78 (Ct. App. 1969) & Bowman, 176 P.2d at 748-49. The state legislature has also
formally adopted the holding in Cobbs as part of the Book of Approved Jury Instructions
("BAJI") section 6.11. James D. Nichols, Lawyer's Advice on Physician Conduct with
Malpractice Cases, 407 CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS AND RELATED RES. 14-8 (2003). BAJI section
6.11 is the standard informed consent jury instruction. 1 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA,
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 446-47 (June 2008).
64. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 9.
65. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
66. Id. at 485.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993).
70. Id. at 599.
MEDICAL CREDIT CARDS
certain cancer treatment when recommending it as treatment to the
plaintiffs' deceased relative. "' The plaintiffs alleged that
[s]uch mortality information . . . especially the statistical
morbidity rate of pancreatic cancer ... was material to Mr.
Arato's decision whether to undergo postoperative
treatment; had he known the bleak truth concerning his life
expectancy, he would not have undergone the rigors of an
unproven therapy, but would have chosen to live out his last
days ... arranging his business affairs. Instead, ... in the
false hope that radiation and chemotherapy treatments
could effect a cure[,] . . . Mr. Arato failed to order his
affairs in contemplation of his death, an omission that...
led eventually to the failure of his contracting business and
to substantial real estate and tax losses following his
death. 72
The plaintiffs further claimed that Bowman supported an action for
recovery" because the physicians did not disclose life expectancy
data that would have enabled the patient to make a more informed
decision regarding his non-medical interests.74  The California
Supreme Court in Arato held that the informed-consent-like
requirement imposed by Bowman was limited to only medical
interests because the court in Moore stated that a "physician is not
the patient's financial adviser."75
Thus, the court in Arato differentiated between a physician's
duty to protect his patient's physical health by obtaining the patient's
informed consent regarding possible medical complications arising
from medical treatment, and a duty to protect the patient's financial
health by obtaining the patient's informed consent to possible non-
medical (i.e., financial) complications arising from medical
treatment. Consequently, for two reasons, it is improbable that a
court would afford a remedy to a patient claiming that a physician
violated a fiduciary duty to a patient by not revealing the possibility
71. Id.
72. Id. at 602.
73. Bowman held that "[a]s fiduciaries it was the duty of the defendants [physicians] to make
a full and fair disclosure to plaintiff of allfacts which materially affected his rights and interests."
Bowman v. McPheeters, 176 P.2d 745, 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) (emphasis added).
74. Arato, 858 P.2d at 608.
75. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 n.10 (Cal. 1990).
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of financial harm resulting from borrowing on a credit card or loan.
First, the court in Arato specifically held that the physician is not
responsible for disclosing possible financial consequences of
treatment. 76 Second, in our hypothetical situation, the patient's
potential financial suffering does not actually result from a treatment
recommendation-it results from a personal, non-medical
recommendation by the physician.
B. Physicians' Financial Interests Versus Patients'
Financial Interests: Arbitration Agreements
A second way to evaluate the physician-patient relationship is
by examining how California statutes and common law treat
conflicts of interest in which a physician's own interests could
conflict with the non-medical interests of the patient. This type of
conflict is closer in line with the conflict that arises in the case of
medical credit cards and loans. In the hypothetical situation
described in Part I, the physician does not stand to profit from
recommending a particular treatment. Rather, the physician stands to
profit from recommending a non-treatment action-specifically,
which medical credit card or loan the patient uses to pay for
treatment.
Arbitration agreements are a similar example of how physicians
can legally influence their patients' non-treatment interests to protect
his own interests. When a physician compels his patients to sign an
arbitration agreement, the physician intentionally affects the legal
rights of his patients77 to gain personal benefits for himself.7
Similarly, when a physician recommends that a patient borrow the
cost of treatment from a certain loan or on a medical credit card, the
physician intentionally affects the financial well-being of the patient
to gain personal benefits for himself.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1295 governs
arbitration agreements in the medical arena. " It demands specific
76. Arato, 858 P.2d at 608.
77. Weldon E. Havins & James Dalessio, Limiting the Scope of Arbitration Clauses in
Medical Malpractice Disputes Arising in California, 28 CAP. U.L. REV. 331, 336 (2000)
(pointing out that by agreeing to arbitration, both parties surrender their right to a trial by jury).
78. Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the
Importance of Volition, 35 Am. Bus. L.J. 105, 106 (1997) (describing the general benefits of
utilizing arbitration to settle disputes as opposed to litigation).
79. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 2008).
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language to make such an arbitration agreement legally binding."
When assessing the validity of such agreements, courts rely on
general contract principles. 8  Thus, although a unique relationship
exists between the physician and the patient in regards to treatment,
the judiciary and the legislature disregard this trust-based
relationship in favor of general legal principles where the physician-
patient interaction does not concern treatment. Notice that the
interaction between physician and patient in the hypothetical
situation in Part I is similarly a non-treatment aspect of the
physician-patient relationship. Thus, it may be safe to assume that
the courts would similarly disregard the trust aspect underlying the
treatment relationship when evaluating a suit arising from the
financial harm a patient suffers as a result of her physician's
negligent recommendation of a medical credit card or loan.
C. Situation-Specific Regulation
In certain situations, California courts and the state legislature
have identified and curbed specific conflicts of interest that arise
when physicians conduct their therapeutic relationships with patients
in such a way that the physicians' actions may affect their own
financial interests. For example, in 1986, the state curbed the ability
of physicians to use the referral process for personal financial gain
when it passed section 654.2 of the California Business and
Professions Code.82 Section 654.2 prohibits any person licensed
under division two of the Code, including all types of physicians and
physician assistants,83 from referring patients to affiliates in which
the licensee, or the licensee's immediate family, has a "significant
80. Id. § 1295(a)-(c).
81. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996); Victoria v. Superior
Court, 710 P.2d 833, 834 (Cal. 1985). For an example of courts employing general contract
principles to resolve disputes over arbitration agreements in the medical arena, see Havins &
Dalessio, supra note 77 (discussing the conflict over whether to bind nonsignatories to arbitration
agreements that fall under the purview of the California Code of Civil Procedure section 1295);
see also Victoria, 710 P.2d 833 (holding that in assessing the case's facts according to certain
basic principles of contract law, it was clear that by signing an arbitration agreement before
medical treatment commenced, it was not the patient-signatory's intent to include claims for
sexual assault by employees of the company administering treatment in that arbitration
agreement).
82. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 654.2 (West 2009).
83. Id. §§ 1600, 3500 (West 2009). Division 2 also includes, but is not limited to, nurses (§
2700), chiropractors (§ 1000), dentists (§ 1600), dietitians (§ 2585), physical therapists (§ 2600),
and optometrists (§ 3000).
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beneficial interest" without informing the patients of the financial
interest in writing first. 84
California also protects patients by regulating the dispensing of
prescription drugs. Section 4170(a)(3) of the California Business
and Professions Code restricts physicians from owning a pharmacy. 85
In Park Medical Pharmacy v. San Diego Orthopedic Associates
Medical Group, Inc., 6 the court held that while physicians may
distribute medications to their own patients for profit, physicians
cannot own or operate a pharmacy that caters to the general public. 87
The court in Magan Medical Clinic, interpreting an earlier but
substantively identical amendment of the California Business and
Professions Code, 18 expounded that the law was intended to prevent
physicians from prescribing drug treatment based on profit motives
rather than on their patients' actual needs. 89
No section of the California Business and Professions Code
specifically regulates physicians' roles in patients' choices regarding
assumption of debt via medical credit cards or loans. Nor does any
current California case law specifically address this phenomenon. In
an effort to better regulate dentists in the medical credit card and loan
arena, in February 2008, California State Senators Sheila Kuehl and
Sam Aanestad introduced Senate Bill 1633 to amend the California
Business and Professions Code." The Senate Bill sought to prohibit
dentists, their employees, and their agents from arranging a line of
third-party credit on behalf of, or referring patients to, a third-party
lender without first providing a written9' disclosure9" regarding the
84. Id. § 654.2(a).
85. Id. § 4170(a)(3).
86. 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858 (Ct. App. 2002).
87. Id. at 867.
88. In this case, the court analyzed CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 654 (amended 1979).
89. Magan Med. Clinic v. Cal. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256, 262 (Ct. App.
1967).
90. Complete Bill History, S.B. 1633, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008), http://
info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_1601-1650/sb_1633_bill_20080927.history.html (last
visited Mar. 20, 2009).
91. S.B. 1633(l)(c), 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
92. Some of the disclosures include the following: the amount the patient is applying for;
that the patient may choose not to borrow from the third-party lender; that the credit is offered by
a third party and not by the dentist; that the patient is entitled to a written treatment plan prior to
applying for the credit card or loan; that the dentist cannot charge treatment and lab costs to the
line of credit or loan until the patient actually undergoes treatment or the dentist has provided the
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transaction in the patient's primary language.93  Although the
California State Assembly and Senate passed the bill, Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed it on September 27, 2008.94 As a
result, only general consumer credit laws continue to directly
regulate this area.
IV. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW
As discussed in the hypothetical situation in Part I, physicians'
choices of which third-party line of credit or loan to market to their
patients have the potential to dramatically affect their patients'
financial well-being. Presumably, physicians maintain their
professional ethical standards and legal responsibilities to their
patients when they recommend only necessary treatment. As Part III
notes, California is willing to regulate potential conflicts of interest
in the medical profession and to impose specific fiduciary duties on
physicians to protect the patient's physical well-being. While courts
have espoused the notion that the trust-based and confidential
relationship between physicians and patients gives rise to a fiduciary
duty to protect a patient's physical health, California courts have
refused to recognize the financial health of the patient as part of the
physician's concern. "
A substantial conflict of interest arises when a physician offers
medical lines of credit or loans, and can determine his own merchant
discount rate by encouraging patients to choose the plan that benefits
the physician the most. The issue becomes whether physicians
should be required to disclose their financial interest in the plan to
their patients. The potential harm to a patient does not satisfy the
requirement set forth in Arato v. Avedon because the harm is
financial in nature. However, the conflict of interest at issue falls
squarely into the category of physician actions that the Magan
Medical Clinic court sought to prevent-situations where a "doctor's
judgment is influenced by a profit motive."" The court made it clear
treatment plan; that the patient may incur interest or penalties on the charges; that missed
payments could hurt the patient's credit rating; and that the patient could be sued as a result. Id.
93. S.B. 1633(l)(e), 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
94. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
95. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 608 (Cal. 1993); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990).
96. 57 Cal. Rptr. 256, 262 (Ct. App. 1967).
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that protecting patients from profit-driven physicians was a
significant priority when it concluded that physicians may not own
pharmacies. 97 Thus, it is certainly possible that the state legislature
would be open to regulating the strikingly similar conflict of interest
here.
However, judicial reasoning behind limiting the fiduciary duty
of informed consent supplies an interesting insight into a potential
issue for the legislature in drafting regulations. The judiciary has
expressed concern that if physicians' fiduciary duties are extended to
include protecting patients' financial health as well as physical
health, physicians could be required to make broad predictions about
patients' lives just to avoid a malpractice suit. The court in Arato
stated that a physician's fiduciary duties do not include the duty "to
disclose every contingency that might affect the patient's nonmedical
'rights and interests."' 98 This clarification was necessary to avoid a
limitless informed consent standard that would be impossible for
physicians to satisfy.
Earlier, the court in Cobbs v. Grant set out to skirt the same
problem when it limited the duty of informed consent to issues of
medicine. 99 The Cobbs court held that "the patient's interest in
information does not extend to a lengthy polysyllabic discourse on
all possible complications. A mini-course in medical science is not
required ... ." 100 The court in Arato added that it would be "unwise
to require as a matter of law that a particular species of information
be disclosed" because each patient's mental and physical abilities are
different; thus, the physician should have case-by-case discretion as
to what information is necessary to fully inform a particular
patient. ' This traditional understanding of informed consent
prevents a patient from suing a physician for giving advice or
withholding information about lenders and financial agreements that
may negatively affect the patient's health. Such information does
not directly concern the patient's treatment, and requiring physicians
to disclose such information would destroy any notion of a limited
informed consent doctrine. However, this understanding also
97. Id.
98. Arato, 858 P.2d at 609 (first emphasis added).
99. Cobbs, 501 P.2dat 11-12.
100. Id. at 11.
101. Arato, 858 P.2d at 606-07.
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provides guidance for possible legislation in that the courts do not
approve of a limitless informed consent doctrine. Thus, the
legislature may be more open to imposing a duty to inform patients
of possible non-medical consequences where there is also a well-
defined limit to what information the physician is required to
disclose and when the physician is required to disclose it.
Additionally, this traditional understanding of informed consent
relies on the assumption that a physician's only role in his patients'
lives is that of medical caretaker. Where physicians choose to
market medical credit cards and loans, aid their patients in obtaining
them, and influence their own financial wellbeing by manipulating
the financial terms of a patient's contract with a third-party lender,
physicians step out of their traditional role as medical caretakers.
Similarly, as discussed in Part III.B, when physicians draft
arbitration agreements and require that potential patients sign them
before entering into a treatment relationship, physicians step out of
their traditional role as medical caretakers.
The California legislature included California Code of Civil
Procedure Code section 1295 as part of the Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act. 102 One could make an argument that
arbitration agreements are inherently unconscionable based on the
fact that the patient could be denied treatment should the patient
decide not to sign the agreement. 03 However, section 1295(e) states
that if the arbitration agreement at issue includes the mandatory
language specified in 1295(a), (b), and (c), then the agreement
cannot be held to be a "contract of adhesion, nor unconscionable nor
otherwise improper . . . ." "' The court in Rosenfield v. Superior
Court "5  commented that the legislature's incorporation of
subdivision (e) signaled that there existed a "determination to avert
the creation of" unconscionability and oppressiveness by requiring
the specific language requirements detailed in subdivisions (a), (b),
and (c). 06 The court further commented that "[i]f an arbitration
agreement does not contain the warnings prescribed in section 1295,
factual issues are then created concerning the parties' reasonable
102. Havins & Dalessio, supra note 77, at 331.
103. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 7, at 675.
104. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(e) (West 2009).
105. 191 Cal. Rptr. 611 (Ct. App. 1983).
106. Id. at 613.
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expectations and whether the contract is in fact oppressive or
unconscionable." 107 Indeed, by mandating the use of specific
language, the legislature "encourages and facilitates the arbitration
of medical malpractice disputes by specifying uniform language to
be used in binding arbitration contracts to assure that the patient
knows what he is signing and what its ramifications are." 108 Thus,
the legislature could be open to regulating the physician-patient
relationship involving medical credit cards and loans as long as it
could control how physicians convey information to patients so as to
protect the interests of patients.
V. PROPOSAL
The solution that resolves this conflict of interest must be
sensitive to the current conditions of the health care market. The
court in Chew v. Meyer "09 recognized the changing face of medicine
when it stated that "as a result of the proliferation of health and
disability insurance, sick pay and other employment benefits,"
patients rely on physicians to fill out the requisite forms, or to
provide information "possessed solely by the treating physician," and
to sign the forms to confirm their truth and validity. 110
The hypothetical situation described in Part I presents a related
facet of this new world. Like insurance, credit cards provide patients
with a means to pay for health care. When physicians have the
opportunity to become involved in the application, approval, and
payment-plan selection process, the possibility of a conflict of
interest arises. Just as physicians may choose to accept certain
traditional consumer credit cards as forms of payment and not accept
others, and just as they may choose to accept only certain insurance
plans and not others, physicians should be able to choose which
medical credit cards and loans to accept.
Unfortunately, the current system lacks equilibrium between the
interests of the physician and those of the patient. The interest of
physicians to conduct their practices as they choose must be weighed
107. Id.
108. Gross v. Recabaren, 253 Cal. Rptr. 820, 822-23 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Barry Keene,
California's Medical Malpractice Crisis, in A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ISSUE 31 (David G. Warren & Richard Merritt eds., 1976)).
109. 527 A.2d 828 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)
110. Id. at 832.
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against the interest of patients to feel secure that they can depend on
their physician for unbiased information in a no-pressure
environment. In order to strike a balance, physicians who accept or
aid a patient in obtaining a line of credit or loan should be subjected
to regulations. This Note proposes a legislative solution that consists
of six components. Violation of any of these components should
result in civil penalties. First and foremost, the legislation should
apply to all physicians who choose to accept a medical credit card or
loan as a form of payment.
Second, a physician's use of marketing tools should be limited
to simple pamphlets only, such as the ones commonly distributed
today. " Moreover, third-party lenders should not be allowed to
counsel or advise physicians or their staff on sales tactics.
Third, before a physician distributes information on a line of
credit or loan, both the patient and the physician should be required
to sign a short disclosure form provided by the state. The disclosure
form could be modeled after a portion of the written notice detailed
in Senate Bill 1633(c) 112 and might read as follows:
The attached information is for a line of credit or loan
to help you finance your medical treatment. You do not
have to apply for a line of credit or loan to pay for
treatment. You may pay your physician for treatment in a
different manner.
This line of credit or loan is not a payment plan with
your physician's office. It is a line of credit with [name of
third-party lender]. Your physician does not work for this
company.
The merchant discount rate your doctor pays as a
service fee to [name of third-party lender] may vary
depending on the terms of the agreement between you and
[name of third-party lender].
There may be other third-party lenders that specialize
in lines of credit or loans geared toward medical bills. You
are entitled to research all of these options before
committing to one line of credit or loan.
111. See Part VI for a more detailed discussion of the attributes of these pamphlets.
112. S.B. 1633(l)(c), 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008). See Part III.C for a complete
discussion of this senate bill.
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You may be required to pay interest on the amount
charged to the line of credit or loan. Missed payments can
appear on your credit report and hurt your credit rating.
You may also be sued.
The physician would be required to sign the form himself, and
have the patient sign the form. Further, the physician would be
required to provide a copy of this form to the patient in the patient's
primary language. The physician would also be required to keep a
copy of this form in the patient's file for a minimum of ten years
after the information is distributed.
Fourth, physician should be allowed to aid patients in obtaining
these lines of credit and loans. Physicians do have valid interests in
doing so, 13 and denying physicians this ability could lead to
unethical and illegal behavior by those who would continue the
practice to increase their own profits. Additionally, in order to avoid
passing unenforceable legislation while still addressing existing
deficiencies in patient protection, the proposed legislation would
require a cooling-off period between the physician's
recommendation of the line of credit or loan and the patient's
subsequent submission of a credit application through the physician's
office.
Fifth, physicians who choose to aid their patients in obtaining
lines of credit or loans should also be required to devote a portion of
their required continuing education credits to learning about the
issues involved with financing medical procedures and related
appropriate boundaries of the physician-patient relationship
Finally and most importantly, a physician should have no
authority over the agreement between the third-party lender and the
patient. The physician should have absolutely no influence over
what rates the third-party lender charges the patient or whether the
patient qualifies for a special promotional rate through that lender.
113. Such interests include "[i]ncrease[d] case acceptance,... [i]ncrease[d] gross revenue and
profitability . . . [and] [n]on-recourse payment to practice prior to treatment." Capital One
Healthcare Finance: Benefits and Details, http://www.capitalonehealthcarefinance.comdental/
doctors/benefits.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). Additionally, many professional medical
associations recognize the good qualities of these lines of credit and loans, and endorse them as a
result. See, e.g., CareCredit, Endorsements, http://www.carecredit.com/endorsements.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2009).
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VI. JUSTIFICATION
There are several reasons why patients should demand legal
protection in this area. First, "health care 'has a special moral status
and therefore a particular public interest."' "' Also, "the relationship
... between the members of the profession and those who seek its
services cannot be likened to the relationship of a merchant to his
customer." 115
Additionally, legal, ethical, and social conventions define the
boundaries of the physician-patient relationship so that the two may
"maintain a professional helping relationship that meets the patient's
needs." 16 Courts have recognized that "[t]he fiducial nature of the
physician-patient relationship flows not from the physician's ethical
duties, but rather as a result of the physician's unique role in
society." "' Moreover, the Code of Medical Ethics, established by
the American Medical Association, influences the ethical
conventions of the physician-patient relationship by serving not as a
system of legal duties but rather as a compilation of higher ethical
standards to which physicians should adhere. "8 Further, nearly 100
percent of graduating medical students in the United States take a
form of the modem Hippocratic Oath, "9 which "has remained in
Western Civilization as an expression of ideal conduct for the
physician." 2' Thus, the interest of a state to maintain the
professional integrity of physicians, and especially their moral
standing in the community, is great enough to warrant the legislation
discussed above.
114. Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153, 1159 (Cal. 2000) (citation omitted).
115. Jones v. Fakehany, 67 Cal, Rptr. 810, 815 (Ct. App. 1968) (quoting Lyon v. Lyon, 54
Cal. Rptr. 829, 831 (Ct. App. 1966) (internal quotations omitted)).
116. Ronald M. Epstein, The Patient-Physician Relationship in FUNDAMENTALS OF
CLINICAL PRACTICE, 403, 419 (Mark B. Mengel et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
117. Petrillo v. Syntax Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 960 (Il. App. Ct. 1986).
118. American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
119. Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today: Meaningless Relic or Invaluable Moral
Guide? NOVA, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oath.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
120. AM. MED. ASS'N., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS xi (Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs ed., 2006-2007).
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A. All Physicians, Everywhere
The major failing of Senate Bill 1633 as proposed is that it only
applied to dentists, dental corporations, and their employees and
agents. 121 The state legislature must recognize that the problems
related to medical lines of credit and loans affect patients of every
medical specialty and that the range of specialties is broad. 122
Additionally, "[s]omeone who is ill and seeking help-unlike
someone who is purchasing a pair of socks or a pound of sausages-
is often vulnerable, certainly worried, sometimes uncomfortable, and
frequently frightened." 123 These characteristics are not unique to the
patients of any one kind of physician. Rather, they affect all patients
of all types of physicians. Therefore, the legislation's reach should
be extended to all physicians who accept medical lines of credit and
loans.
B. Marketing Tools
The trust and confidence element of the physician-patient
relationship should be maintained at all costs because of its integral
role in American medicine. 124 Because trust and confidence are
inherent in this relationship, patients might be inclined to take their
physicians' recommendations to apply for a line of credit or loan as
gospel and follow it blindly. For example, physicians are
traditionally encouraged to dress in a professional manner, to engage
in limited personal conversation with patients, and to use formal
language during their encounters with patients to maintain
appropriate boundaries in patient care. 125 Additionally, physicians
are encouraged to counsel patients in their offices only to maintain a
121. See generally S.B. 1633, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
122. The CareCredit website allows patients to search for physicians that accept the line of
credit and lists the following specialties as search options: chiropractic, cosmetic, dental, general
medicine, general surgery, hearing, "other health care services," veterinary, vision, and weight
loss. CareCredit Home Page, supra note 21 (follow "Find a doctor near you" hyperlink). The
Capital One health care finance website allows patients to view information on the loan by
selecting from the following categories: dental, orthodontics, cosmetic, fertility, and vision. See
Capital One, Home Page, supra note 20.
123. Hall & Schneider, supra note 7, at 649-51 (quoting Raymond Tallis, Commentary:
Leave WellAlone, 318 BRIT. MED. J. 1756, 1757 (1999)).
124. Epstein, supra note 116, at 411.
125. Id. at 420. But see James C. Wade, The Patient/Physician Relationship: One Doctor's
View, 14 HEALTH AFFAIRS 209 (1995) (providing a thoughtful discussion on the benefits of
developing a more personal relationship with patients).
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spatial relationship in which patients feel comfortable divulging
sensitive information. 126
Also, the wide disparity in medical knowledge between
physician and patient significantly contributes to the patient's
reliance on the physician. 127 Physicians have the power to
significantly alter a patient's life by, for example, making judgments
on that patient's ability to work or suggesting that the patient suffers
from a terminal disease. 28 Thus, patients rely on physicians to use
their utmost care and discretion when recommending treatment or
advising on a future course of action.
When marketing materials such as pamphlets, "customized
patient payment options worksheets," 129 and scripts for use by office
staff to "educate" patients on payment options 130 invade this unique
trust-based relationship, the natural, more professional relationship is
compromised, and the physician's role in the relationship is blurred.
This situation raises the question of where the physician's medical
role ends and his role as financial adviser begins. Physicians should
be allowed to inform their patients that they accept a certain line of
credit or loan targeted at paying medical bills, but physicians should
not be allowed to use their patients' trust as a way to market those
lines of credit or loans. By restricting marketing tactics to pamphlets
only, the physicians have a controlled outlet to inform patients of an
alternative payment option but no outlet to compromise the
traditional physician-patient boundaries with extra discussion or
strong recommendations in favor of that option.
Note that this does not place a restriction on the ability of
lenders to educate physicians and their staff about how to submit
applications for credit on behalf of their patients. Educating
physicians and their staff on appropriate methods of collecting
patient information and submitting forms on behalf of the patients
does not involve specialized marketing methods designed to
encourage patients to sign up for the service. Eliminating marketing
126. Epstein, supra note 116, at 420.
127. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972).
128. Epstein, supra note 116, at 412.
129. ChaseHealthAdvance, Service and Support for Growing Practices,
http://www.chasehealthadvance.com/providers/service-support.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
130. See, e.g., Capital One Healthcare Finance, Tools for Success, http://www.capitalone
healthcarefinance.com/dental/doctors/fee-scripting.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
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tactics beyond informational pamphlets allows patients to consider
the risks and benefits of such a line of credit or loan without
additional pressure from physicians and their staff. Then, after the
patient decides to borrow from a particular lender, physicians and
their staff can employ their own knowledge of collecting information
and submitting applications to ease those processes for their patients.
C. Written Disclaimer
A notice in writing of the patient's rights concerning payment
options is necessary because it adds a layer of professionalism and
uniformity to the physician-initiated recommendation process. At
the very least, this form provides the patient with a series of
considerations that should impact her decision to borrow the cost of
treatment on a line of credit or loan.
Senate Bill 1633(c) served as the inspiration for the disclosure
detailed in Part V of this Note. The language requirement is based
on Senate Bill 1633(e), which proposed that the written disclosure be
provided in one of the Medi-Cal threshold languages if the patient's
primary language appears on that list. ' The requirement that the
physician keep a copy of the signed disclosure for a minimum of ten
years is based on recommendations of the California Academy of
Family Physicians for the maintenance of routine patient records. 132
D. Cooling-off Period
The proposed cooling-off period would allow physicians to
continue aiding patients to obtain a line of credit or loan, while
protecting the patients' ability to make sound decisions about these
financing options. Sickness severely impairs decision-making
abilities. ' When people are sick or hurt, their diminished ability to
131. S.B. 1633(e), 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Ses. (Cal. 2008).
132. California Academy of Family Physicians, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.familydocs.org/practice-resources/faq.php (follow "How long should I keep medical
records?" hyperlink)(last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
133. Brooke Myers Sorger et. al., Decision-Making Capacity in Elderly, Terminally Ill
Patients with Cancer, 25 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 393, 401 (2007). "Even 'a little loss of animal
toughness, a little irritable weakness and descent of the pain-threshold, will bring the worm at the
core of all our usual springs of delight into full view, and turn us into melancholy
metaphysicians."' Hall & Schneider, supra note 7, at 650 (quoting WILLIAM JAMES, THE
VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 140 (Martin E. Marty ed., Penguin Am. Library 1982)
(1902)). "Chosen from the traditional literary canon and from among the works of contemporary
and culturally diverse writers, novels, short stories, poetry, and drama can convey both the
concrete particularity and the metaphorical richness of the predicaments of sick people and the
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direct attention to reasonable and rational thinking-like choosing a
line of credit or loan-is truncated. The theory of truncated
reasoning maintains that because "the person is devoting part of her
limited conscious attentional capacity to the stressor . [she] has
insufficient capacity remaining to cope with the decision" at hand. '4
Because patients are focused on health issues while in a physician's
office, they have limited abilities to focus on other issues, such as the
implications of credit debt on their financial well-being.
Additionally, a person under stress "does not assimilate all
available information and instead focuses on a very few dimensions
of the problem." ' The brevity and simple language of the credit
card and loan literature available through a physician's office caters
to this psychological phenomenon. 136 Patients are given little
information, which helps explain their willingness to assume the
credit obligation in such a quick fashion. "' Without the burden of
packets of disclosures, or even very much fine print, 13' the patient
can assimilate the information quickly and make the decision to
borrow right in the physician's office. It is reasonable to assume that
the fear of giving up medical care can drive this decision-without
the card, the patient may not be able to afford the procedures the
physician recommends or even afford to see the physician again at
all. Therefore, the patient may not fully consider the implications of
taking on extra debt when those implications are directly juxtaposed
against the threat of continued pain or suffering.
Truncated reasoning also flows from a "motivation to terminate
and escape from the stressful situation as quickly as possible ...
[As a result, p]eople under stress tend to make choices impulsively,
based on a consideration of short-term consequences only." ' For
challenges and rewards offered to their physicians." Rita Charon et al., Literature and Medicine:
Contributions to Clinical Practice, in HEALTH CARE ETHICS 554, 554 (John F. Monagle & David
C. Thomasma eds., 1998).
134. Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REv. 707, 769 (2006).
135. Id.
136. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
137. For example, the Capital One Healthcare Finance loan's brochure lists approximate costs
under offered fixed-rate plans in large print over two panels of the brochure. CAPITAL ONE
HEALTHCARE FINANCE, SMART PAYMENT PLANS (2008) (pamphlet on file with author).
138. In the same Capital One Healthcare Finance loan brochure, there are only six lines of
"fine print"-print that is much smaller than other print used in the brochure. Id.
139. Willis, supra note 134, at 769.
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patients, the choice of whether to borrow on a credit card or loan
commonly comes only after they have heard startling news, as
described in the hypothetical situation in Part I. At that time,
financial considerations only intensify an already stressful situation.
In theory, patients whose physicians accept and aid in obtaining
medical lines of credit and loans are given an "easy" solution to their
financial concerns. Instead of worrying about both their physical and
financial health, patients can resolve their financial concerns before
ever leaving the examination room 140 and then focus all of their
attention on their physical health. In such a situation, the physician
influences not only the patient's physical health but the patient's
financial health as well.
E. Financial Relationship
Physicians essentially assume the role of financial specialist
without the proper qualifications when they determine at what rate
patients will borrow from a third-party lender. Instead of relying on
physicians to influence the patients' relationships with their lender,
the lender should take into account traditional factors of
creditworthiness, most notably, the patient's FICO score. "' Lenders
generally determine whether to issue a line of credit or extend a loan
based on information contained in the consumer's credit report,
which lenders purchase from credit-reporting agencies. i42 Unless a
physician has equally sophisticated methods of buying these credit
reports, analyzing them, and predicting how patients will fulfill their
debt obligations in the future, that physician should not have the
ability to overrule traditional qualifiers. "'i The court in Moore v.
Regents of the University of California agreed that a physician's
140. Interview with Dr. X, supra note 28 (discussing that it is common for her office staff to
bring a portable phone to the patient with the credit card representative already on the line
because the patient is in pain and under stress).
141. A consumer's credit score is a number that represents her credit risk to lenders. The Fair
Isaac Corporation determines a consumer's credit score based on the individual's past credit
information maintained by the credit-reporting agencies. MYFICO, UNDERSTANDING YOUR
FICO SCORE 1 (2007), http://www.myfico.com/Downloads/Files/myFICOUYFSBooklet.pdf.
The main factors that lenders use to determine whether to allow a consumer to borrow with them
is the consumer's FICO score, the amount of debt the consumer's income will reasonably allow
her to handle, the consumer's employment history, and the consumer's credit history. Id. at 2.
142. Id. at 3-4. But see Ricks Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very
Credit-Worthy--as Housing Boomed, Industry Pushed Loans to a Broader Market, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 3, 2007, at A l (describing the tactics of the subprime mortgage loan industry).
143. See supra note 141.
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relationship with patients is not that of a financial adviser. '"
Physicians are medical professionals, and their influence over their
patients should be restricted to the medical arena.
F. Continuing Education
Continuing education is a key component of the practice of
medicine. 145 Like many other professionals, physicians are required
to engage in continuing education to maintain, develop, and advance
their professional skills 146 in order to "enhance the physician's ability
to care for patients." "' For example, the David Geffen School of
Medicine at the University of California, Los Angeles planned to
offer many continuing education courses in 2009, including a
comprehensive update of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer, a
urology course, and a course in sleep medicine. 148 A patient expects
that when her physician recommends a treatment or course of
therapy, the patient is receiving the most current, thorough, and
comprehensive recommendations possible. 149 Continuing education
helps make that expectation a reality.
However, when physicians choose to aid their patients in
obtaining lines of credit or loans, they expand their relationship with
their patients beyond its traditional therapeutic boundaries. Such a
physician essentially assumes the role of a financial professional,
akin to a person who provides brokerage services for borrowers. '50
Brokerage services include "[o]btaining or attempting to obtain, on
144. 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990).
145. Geoffrey R. Norman, Susan I. Shannon & Michael L. Marrin, The Need for Needs
Assessment in Continuing Medical Education 328 BRITISH MED. J. 999, 999 (2004).
146. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2190-2196.5 (West 2009) (regulating the
standards and requirements for physician continuing education in California).
147. ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR CONTINUING MED. EDUC., STANDARDS FOR
COMMERCIAL SUPPORT OF CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION 1 (1992), http://med.emory.edu/
CME/pdfs/disclosure-pol.pdf
148. UCLA Health Sciences, Office of Continuing Medical Education: CME Course Listings,
http://www.cme.ucla.edu/courses/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
149. The court in Brune v. Belinkoff mandated that comparable education be the standard in
negligence suits; physicians are held not to the standard of other physicians in the same location
but rather in relation to others who practice their specialty. 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968).
Thus, all physicians of one specialty are expected to have the same knowledge and training as
their fellow physicians. Id.
150. In California, brokerage services for borrowers are governed by chapter nine of the
California Residential Mortgage Lending Act, CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 50700-50707 (West 2009).
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behalf of a borrower, a residential mortgage loan ... ." 151 California
Financial Code section 50705 mandates that any employee of a
residential mortgage lender who provides brokerage services to a
borrower complete the continuing education requirements set forth in
California Business and Professions Code section 10170.5. That
section requires that every four years, the person providing brokerage
services for borrowers complete, among other things,
courses . . . that will enable a licensee to achieve a high
level of competence in serving the objectives of consumers
who may engage the services of licensees to secure the
transfer, financing, or similar objectives with respect to real
property, including organizational and management
techniques that will significantly contribute to this goal. 152
If physicians choose to incorporate financial recommendations
into their practice by selecting a specific third-party lender to endorse
for use by their patients and then aiding those patients in obtaining
the line of credit or loan, then they should be held to a standard
comparable to that of a financial professional. Consequently, the
mandate of finance-related continuing education seems appropriate.
Business and Professions Code subsections 2190.1(a)(3) and (4)
already provide that a portion of a physician's continuing education
hours may be earned by engaging in a professional activity that
concerns professional ethics 153 or one that is "designed to improve
the physician-patient relationship." 114 If designed correctly, courses
on patient finance and the implications of excessive credit could
greatly enhance a physician's understanding of the financial
hardships that patients face and educate the physician about the
appropriate boundaries concerning the financial matters of his
patients.
VII. CONCLUSION
The traditional relationship of trust and confidence between
physician and patient should be maintained at all costs. Legal,
ethical, and professional standards demand it. Luckily, the
151. Id. § 50700(b)(1).
152. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 10170.5 (a)(7) (West 2009).
153. Id. § 2190.1(a)(3).
154. Id. § 2190.1(a)(4).
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California legislature and governor can act to protect patients. A
defense against possible conflicts of interest and a safeguard for
vulnerable patients, the regulation proposed above allows physicians
and patients to continue their unique relationship without infringing
on the interests of either party. Only after the state legislature passes
such regulation can patients feel confident that their health is their
physicians' only priority, and physicians can feel that their patients
have sufficient options to fund their medical treatment.
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